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CONIMENTS

STATE-COURT INJUNCTIONS AND THE
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF LABOR
CONTRACTS: BEYOND NORRIS-LAGUARDIA

H award Lesnick

*

HE question presented is whether federal law restricts state

T power to enjoin a strike as in violation of a collective bar
gaining agreement. The relevant sources of federal law are the
Norris-LaGuardia Act

and section 30r (a) of the Labor-Man

agement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act.2

(r)

1

It seems clear that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not

itself apply to actions in state courts.

It is doubtless true that

many of the animating principles underlying the r932 statute are

implicated whenever a strike is sought to be subjected to the
control of equity, in state or federal court.3

Moreover, the

Supreme Court has dramatically sustained the attribution of

substantive import to Norris-LaGuardia, despite the act's juris
dictional language, as a legislative response to judicial interpreta
tion of earlier statutory regulation.4

Finally, it is at least part

of the story to note that the statute was cast as it was because of

doubts, soon thereafter dispelled, whether Congress had power to

make substantive law to govern labor disputes.5 The fact remains

that the decision was made to write a statute addressed to the

federal courts, that the problem there may have been thought at

*Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B., New York
University, 1952; A.M., Columbia, 1953, LL.B., 1958.
1 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1964) (prohibi
tion of federal court injunctions in labor disputes).

2 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1964): "Suits for violation of con
tracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . or between . . . labor

organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties. "
3 See Cox & BoK, CASES ON LABOR LAw 96-102 (6th ed. 1965).
4 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-37 (1941).
5

See Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 MINN. L. REv. 638, 648-49

(1932)

0
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least to some degree more acute, 6 and that the issue of legislative

policy would have been significantly altered had Congress been
asked to exercise its power to regulate commerce.7

(2) Section 301, it is clear, does apply to state courts.8

be

lieve, however, that the federal law of section 301 should not be

I

held to "incorporate" the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibitions
on injunctions against strikes in breach of contract.

Of course

Norris-LaGuardia is "federal law," and "federal law" controls.

But to settle the question so simply comes close to adjudication

by pun.

As Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl

vania put the matter:

9

Appellant contends that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is an expression
of federal labor policy and as such must be incorporated within and
made an integral part of the national labor policy expressed in
Section 301. Even so, it does not follow that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, if woven into the fabric of Section 301, would express a na

state courts . .

tional labor policy to prohibit the granting of injunctive relief by

Certainly the setting of neither the 1932 nor the 1947 legislative
expression of national labor policy warrants "incorporation" of
.

.

Norris-LaGuardia.10
preme Court's
6

As for judicial pronouncements, the Su

Sinclair Refining

decision 11 says no more than

Federal question jurisdiction prior to I932 involved use of the Sherman Act,

with results that Congress sought to reverse with Norris-LaGuardia. See Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 3II U.S. 9I (I940);
Witte, supra note 5, at 649 n.2o. Diversity jurisdiction in the pre-Erie period en
abled federal judges to fashion more restrictive rules than were being developed in
the courts of some states. See, e.g., Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 483 (I92I). For an illustration of at
tempts to create diversity jurisdiction in labor disputes, see Fortney v. Carter, 203
Fed. 454 (4th Cir. I9I3) (bondholders of struck corporation, alleging threat to their
security interests, permitted to sue strikers).
7 See Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, I6 MINN. L. REV. 638 (1932).
Cj. Comment, II3 U. PA. L. REv.I096, rror (I965):
It would seem illegitimate for a court to accept as a basis for common-law
development a policy which, although desired by the proponents of the bill,
was considered by them too weak to survive the political process and which,
even if an accurate reflection of the mood of Congress, never found expression
in law.
8 Local IJ4, Teamsters Union v.Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
9 Shaw Elec. Co. v. IBEW, 418 Pa. I, II, 208 A.2d 769, 775 (I965).
10

See the discussions in American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837, 852-53 (3d Cir. I964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
935 (I965); McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.
2d 45, 63, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (I957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (I958); Shaw Elec.
Co. v. IBEW, 4I8 Pa. I, Io n.I4, 208 A.2d 769, 774 n.I4 (I965).
11

Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (I962) (federal court may not

enjoin strike in breach of contract).
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that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to strikes in breach of
contract no less than to organizational or bargaining strikes, and
that section 301 cannot be taken to repeal that act, or to authorize
inroads upon its protection. There was no assumption of judicial
responsibility to weigh the need to protect concerted activities
against the danger to the security of contractual arrangements.
Indeed the Court eschewed any such roleY In such a context it
would be intolerable to find in the uniformity principle of Lucas
Flour r:; a sufficient ground for compelling state conformity to the
strictures of Norris-LaGuardia. The channeling of litigation into
state courts because of the availability of injunctive relief there
may be unfortunate/4 but something more is needed to justify
federal invalidation of state law. Since a uniform rule permitting
specific enforcement of no-strike clauses was rejected, not as a
result of the Court's own fashioning of an appropriate rule of
federal labor law, but simply in obedience to the legislative man
date that federal judges not enjoin strikes/5 that rejection (proper
12

[W]e do not see how cases implementing the purpose of § 301 can be said to
have freed this Court from its duty to give effect to the plainly expressed con
gressional purpose with regard to the continued application of the anti-injunc
tion provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The argument to the contrary
seems to rest upon the notion that injunctions against peaceful strikes are
necessary to make the arbitration process effective. But whatever might be
said about the merits of this argument, Congress has itself rejected it. In doing
so, it set the limit to which it was willing to go in permitting courts to effectu
ate the congressional policy favoring arbitration and it is not this Court's
business to review the wisdom of that decision.
ld. at 213. See also id. at 2IO: "When the repeal of a highly significant law is
urged upon [Congress] . . . and that repeal is rejected after careful consideration
and discussion, the normal expectation is that courts will be faithful to their trust
and abide by that decision."
These excerpts suggest the accuracy of reading Sinclair as it was read in
Comment, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1096, noo (1965): "It did not make the positive
determination that a new general anti-injunction policy existed; it made the nega
tive determination that section 301 did not alter the old, limited anti-injunction
policy of Norris-LaGuardia."

13 Local I74, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, ro3 (1962):
"[T]he subject matter of§ 301(a) 'is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law. ' ...

The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under
state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements."

14 See Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Sinclair Ref. Co.v.Atkinson,
370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962); Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some

Unanswered Questions, 63 Co LU M L. REv. 1027, 1034-36 (1963); Summers, Labor
Law Decisions of Supreme Court, 1961 Term, in ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS
LAW PROCEEDINGS $1, 63 (1962).
15 Consistent with its view that it was not making law, the Court in Sinclair
did not even consider the effect of its decision on state power. See Mr. Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion, 370 U.S. at 226.
.
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though it was 16) should not now be parlayed with a revived
interest in practical accommodations and judicial creativity to
compel the states to obey a mandate never addressed to them.
(3) The matter is not closed, however, by a judgment that the
federal law of section 301 does not incorporate Norris-LaGuardia.
The anti-injunction statute aside, it seems clear that the conditions
governing the availability of injunctive relief should not be re
garded as "procedural" for the purpose of deciding the choice of
governing law. The question is nothing less "substantive" than
the balance to be struck between the need to vindicate contract
rights through specific performance and the dangers to protected
concerted activities of permitting equity to exercise its fearsome
powers too close by. Had Congress never enacted the 1932 statute,
we would long since have seen the development of a corpus of
federal rulings dealing with injunctions in labor disputes. Some
would have been the product of judicial decisions/7 others em
bodied in the Federal Rules/8 other enacted by the legislature.19
These principles would govern federal court actions, and the
Supreme Court would have authority to decide whether effectu
ation of the purposes of the extensive federal regulatory scheme
in the labor-management field called for similar restrictions on
state power to enforce no-strike clauses.20
16
See Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process,
72 YALE L. J. 1547, 1559, 1563-66 (1963) ("A proper accommodation-one that
best serves the policy of section 301 without undermining the purposes of Norris

LaGuardia- seemingly would allow a district court to enjoin a breach of contract
strike over an arbitrable grievance. " " [ But] resolution of contested issues touching
upon sensitive areas of our social and economic life should be made by the elector
ally based and therefore responsive political institutions.")
17
See the celebrated opinion of Judge Amidon in Great No. Ry. v. Brous
seau, 286 Fed. 414 (D.N.D. 1923).
18
See FED. R. Crv. P. 65 (injunctions).
19
See National Labor Relations Act§ ro(l), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended,
29 U.S.C.§ 16o(l) (r964) (interlocutory injunction relief in NLRB proceedings);
28 U.S.C. §

1292(a) (1) (1964) (interlocutory orders of district courts regarding

injunctive relief appealable to courts of appeals).
2° Cf. Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions- The Converse

of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHio Sr. L. J. 384, 387 (1956):
[W]hen federally-created rights are enforced in the state courts .. . the
cardinal consideration is federal paramountcy. . . .Moreover, federal para
mountcy extends as much to procedural as to substantive matters; if the federal
purpose is clear, and if it is valid, there is no room for local procedural auton
omy . . . and this is true whether the federal purpose is evidenced by an
express Congressional enactment of a "procedural" character or is reasonably
inferable from the substantive federal right in issue.
Even a firm adherent of a "general rule . . . that federal law takes the state
courts as it finds them," Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54

rg66]

SECTION 301 AND NORRIS-LaGUARDIA

An affirmative answer would often be called for. The federal
law whose application Lincoln Mills prescribes is one "which the
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." 21
One can, I believe, sum up the themes of federal concern with
reasonable accuracy in a few words, although documentation
would require a sensitive recollection of two generations of
history. The core of the danger is improvident inhibition of pro
tected strikes -in practice not often undone by subsequent lift
ing of the restraint- through fallible factfinding or overbroad
decrees.22 The development of the preemption doctrine has made
clear the central concern, in the Court's perception of national
labor policy, that protected concerted activities have "breathing
space to survive." 23 There is a strong federal interest in assuring
that the remedial scheme by which contract rights are vindicated
does not encroach unduly on protected activities.24 Breach-of
contract suits are of course not removed from judicial cognizance,
whether state or federal,25 but a state may now vindicate stateCoLuM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954), would presumably acknowledge a greater concern
with the impact of state "procedure" when it is the federal rights of defendants
(rather than plaintiffs) that are at stake. Cf. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 397 (1953) (jurisdiction of state court to hear
federal defense). As for the "defense " of removal, see note 36 infra.
21 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.
S. 448, 456 (1957).

22
To elaborate this problem here would by now be superfluous. See, e.g., Aaron,
Labor Injunctions in the State Courts- Part II: A Critique, so VA. L. REv. II47,
1156-58 (1964).
23 The phrase is Mr. Justice Brennan's, referring to first amendment rights, in
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). In the labor context, see Liner v.
Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306-o8 (1964) (danger that state law of mootness would
hinder NLRB determination of legal status of picketing); Local 438, Construction
Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 550 (1963) (danger that temporary injunction, if
not appealable to Supreme Court, would "effectively dispose" of union's right to
picket); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953) (danger that state
would enjoin picketing that NLRB would permit).
24
Even when state substantive law is permitted to operate, as in the case of
"right to work" laws, the Court has proscribed equitable relief against strikes or
picketing that is aimed at obtaining a union-security agreement violative of state
law, Local 438, Construction Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), while permit
ting the state to invalidate or hold actionable a union-security arrangement ob

tained through collective bargaining. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375
U.S. 96 (1963). A substantial reason for holding that state power "begins only
with actual negotiation and execution " of the agreement, see id. at 105, is the
danger of permitting state court litigation about the object of concerted activities
to constrain protected conduct "erroneously" found to have a forbidden object.
See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499 (1953).

25 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.
S. 195 (1962) (NLRB jurisdiction does
not preclude judicial jurisdiction); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502 (1962) (federal court jurisdiction does not preclude that of state courts).
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created rights only to the extent that they conform to the evolving
federal law of labor contracts.26 Indeed, description of the con
tract rights in question as "state-created/' while doubtless an
accurate reflection of the traditions that move a state court to
grant or deny a right of action, can probably claim no better
legal credentials than those accorded harmless error.27 Federal law
should set the outer limits of the availability of injunctive relief
in actions governed by section 301.
(4) The question therefore remains: What is the content of
the relevant federal law? Some immediately visible problem
areas can be readily perceived. The greater difficulty is to strike
a proper balance between the demands of federal labor policy
and of state procedural autonomy. The case that seems to me
easiest to resolve in favor of federal restraint is the use of ex parte
restraining orders. Here lies the greatest danger to federally pro
tected rights.28 At the same time, the interference with state pro
cedure is relatively slight. I would argue that the spirit of Rule
65 (b) 29 and NLRA section IO (l) 30 must be observed, and
that restraining orders should not be issuable without notice ex
cept on a recitation of immediate need and (more important)
should be limited to a short time certain, not renewable ex parte.
More difficulty surrounds the procedure governing preliminary
injunctions. One can readily state the requisites of full protec
tion: an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on demand;
26

Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1962).

A broader reading of the Dowd Box, Lucas Flour, and Evening News cases, as
rendering all of the underlying aims of the preemption doctrine wholly inapplicable
to § 301 actions, is not warranted by the decisions.
27

State substantive rules of contract law must bow when they would hold

actionable what federal law deems lawful, see id. at 105 n.r4, and when they
would treat as permitted what under federal law is sufficient to constitute a breach.
Cf. United Steelworkers v.American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The Court
has not, to my knowledge, given any support to the view that state substantive
law is permitted to operate as such within a "zone of reasonableness " set by federal
law. See Textile Workers Union v.Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) ("any
state law applied ...will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independ
ent source of private rights"); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,

supra note 26, at 102; American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837, 857 (3d Cir. 1964) (Hastie, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 380 U.S.935 (1965).
28
For the still-classic statement of the problem of "temporary " equitable relief,
see FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 200-02 (1930); on ex parte
applications, see id. at 223.
29
FED. R.Crv.P. 65 (b).
30 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 16o(l) (1964).
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appellate or similar 31 review within the state system; 32 capacity
of respondents under the restraint of a preliminary injunction to
bring the proceedings promptly on for final hearing if desired.
Here, however, countervailing considerations seem stronger. Is
it appropriate for federal common law to prescribe a particular
allocation of judicial responsibilities within the state system? 33
Assuming the availability of Supreme Court review of injunc
tions issued by lower state courts and not appealable under state
law/4 does the relative inadequacy of the certiorari mechanism
and its procedures for determining the question of a stay pending
review warrant federal insistence on a state's creation or expan
sion of intramural avenues of redress?
The question of the availability of injunction bonds presents,
in my view, a relatively weaker federal need. The aim of bond
requirements is twofold: to discourage improper resort to equity
through a financial deterrent, and to provide some recompense for
respondents wrongly denied self-help at the time they chose to
resort to it. When the procedures by which a state litigates equity
suits are otherwise adequate to safeguard federally protected
rights, I would not think that this requirement is so central to
the protection of such rights that a state must provide it.
The thesis of this Comment is the presence of "federal law"
apart from the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That law asks whether a
particular aspect of a state's equity jurisprudence unduly threat
ens the policy against erosion of federally protected concerted
31

I have in mind here the practice of review by a court en bane of orders issued

by a single judge.
32 Cf. 28 U.S. C. § r292 (a) (r) (rg64) (district court issuance or denial of pre
liminary injunction appealable to court of appeals) ; Local 438, Construction Union
v. Curry, 37r U.S. 542 (r963) (state court issuance of preliminary injunction
appealable to Supreme Court when federal defense litigated).
33 It should be borne in mind that the prescription would probably be condi
tional only. A state would be required to meet federal standards or forego the ex

ercise of equity jurisdiction. It would, of course, be a far greater interference to tell
a state that it was required to grant specific enforcement of no-strike clauses, but
subject to federal restraints on the procedure for doing so. I would not think that
the obligation of state courts to enforce federal law, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (r947), embraces any such requirement, although the problem might have
been somewhat more difficult had Sinclair not been decided as it was.
34 The assumption has two aspects: (a) the application of the rule of the Curry
case, see note 32 supra, to § 30I actions; (b) characterization of the lower state
court as the highest "in which a decision could be had " (28 U.S.C.§ r257 (rg64)),
despite the later availability, on issuance of a permanent injunction, of further
state court review.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

activities.35 Illustrations are needed to give flesh to the under
lying question, and to suggest the process of forming an answer,
but it would be premature for me to press the analysis further
here.36 The concept of federal law applicable only in state courts
seems a strange one. But the Norris-LaGuardia Act is an uncom
mon piece of legislation. Its applicability to federal court
actions prevented the development of more particularized restric
tions on state equity jurisdiction, but its inapplicability to state
court actions does not render inapplicable all federal concern.
Once the demands of the federal common law are perceived, and
the governing considerations expressed, the resolution of specific
problems remains the task of that fallible, indispensable servant,
"litigating elucidation."
35 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), dealing with state law of ob
scenity, involves the imposition of analogous requirements- burden of proof on
the state, judicial determination of the status of the challenged film, injunctive

relief pending judicial review limited to short fixed period-when the federal
rights sought to be protected are of constitutional stature. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 51 (1964), may portend a similar development in the area of
libel. Cf. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 513
( 1953). See also Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 340 ( 1965) (concurring opinion
of Brennan, J .) (state postconviction remedies).
36

Putting aside any supposed "incorporation" of Norris-LaGuardia, it seems

clear that a court fashioning federal common law should not adopt a rule absolutely
prohibiting specific relief against a strike in breach of contract. See, e.g., the
discussion in Wellington & Albert, supra note 16, at 1552-59.
If state courts are to be permitted the exercise of equity jurisdiction denied to
federal judges by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the removal jurisdiction should not be
read to permit an end-run around such jurisdiction. See the discussion in Comment,
I I 3 U. PA. L. R Ev. 1096, 1097-98 (1965).

